State v. Razo-Chavez Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 42398 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
3-17-2015
State v. Razo-Chavez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42398
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Razo-Chavez Appellant's Brief Dckt. 42398" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5433.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5433
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID OPY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) No. 42398 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) Twin Falls Co. Case No. 
vs. ) CR-2013-12233 
) 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
HONORABLERANDYJ.STOKER 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 





The Roark Law Firm 
409 North Main Street 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1 
ISSUE .............................................................................................................. 3 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4 
The District Court Erred When It Modified The Mental 
State Element Of the Approved Standard Jury Instructions .................. 4 
A. lntroduction ................................................................................. 4 
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................... 4 
C. The District Court Erred By Giving A Jury Instruction 
That Misstated The Law Regarding The Mental State 
Element Of Possession of A Controlled Substance ................... .4 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 8 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................ 8 
APPENDICES 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
State v. Amelia, 144 Idaho 332, 160 P.3d 771 (Ct. App. 2007) ........................... 5 
State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 122 P.3d 321 (Ct. App. 2005) ........................ 5 
State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 232 P.3d 327 (2010) ............................................. 6 
State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368,256 P.3d 776 (Ct. App. 2011) ........................... 7 
Statev. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1,333 P.3d 112 (2014) ............................................. 5 
State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512, 129 P.3d 1261 (Ct. App. 2005) ......................... 5 
State v. Neal, 155 Idaho 484, 314 P.3d 166 (2013) ............................................. 4 
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009) ...................................... 4 
State v. Tucker, 131 Idaho 174, 953 P.2d 614 (1998) ......................................... 5 
STATUTES 
l.C. § 37-2709 ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.C. § 37-2732 ..................................................................................................... 1 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the judgment of conviction upon a guilty verdict to 
one count of possession of Oxycodone. Although not requesting relief, the state 
is challenging the district court's modification of the approved elements jury 
instruction by striking language that belief the substance is a controlled 
substance satisfies the mental state element of possession of a controlled 
substance. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Officers found Benito Razo-Chavez in possession of a baggie and straw 
with an orange powder residue that tested positive for two controlled substances: 
Oxycodone and Buprenorphine, the latter being an ingredient in the brand name 
drug Suboxone. 1 (Tr., p. 32, L. 5 - p. 36, L. 24; p. 80, L. 25 - p. 89, L. 16.) The 
state charged Razo with one count of felony possession of Oxycodone. (R., pp. 
62-63.) The matter proceeded to trial. (R., pp. 113-15.) At trial Razo admitted 
possessing Suboxone, but denied any knowledge of the presence of Oxycodone. 
(Tr., p. 101, L. 5 - p. 103, L. 7; p. 108, L. 24 - p. 109, L. 8; p. 113, Ls. 5-12.) 
Over the prosecution's objections, the district court modified the mental 
state element of the approved jury instruction from "the defendant either knew it 
was [Oxycodone] or believed it was a controlled substance" to "the defendant 
either knew it was oxycodone or believed it was oxycodone." (Tr., p. 120, L. 1 -
1 Buprenorphine is a Schedule Ill controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2709(e)(2)(i). 
Its possession without a prescription is a misdemeanor. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(3). 
1 
p. 144, L. 21; R., p. 128 (copy attached as appendix A); ICJI 403 (attached as 
Appendix 8).) Specifically, the district court concluded that the law "requires 
knowledge that one is in possession of the substance. In other words, what the 
defendant is charged with, not what he had." (Tr., p. 140, Ls. 11-15.) 
The jury returned a guilty verdict. (R., p. 121.) The district court imposed 
a sentence of four years with two years determinate, suspended the sentence, 
and ordered probation. (R., pp. 144-48.) The state filed a notice of appeal timely 
from entry of the judgment. (R., pp. 159-61.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it modified the mental state element of the 
approved standard jury instructions? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Modified The Mental State Element Of the 
Approved Standard Jury Instructions 
A. Introduction 
Over the state's objection, the district court modified the mental state 
element in the approved elements instruction to require the state to prove that 
Razo knew or believed the substance was Oxycodone, rather than requiring 
proof that Razo knew it was Oxycodone or believed it was a controlled 
substance. (Compare Appendix A with Appendix B.) The state contends the 
district court erred. Moreover, although the state is not requesting any affirmative 
relief in this case, this issue is not moot because it is an issue that would 
otherwise evade review. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 
414, 430 (2009). 
C. The District Court Erred By Giving A Jury Instruction That Misstated The 
Law Regarding The Mental State Element Of Possession of A Controlled 
Substance 
''The crime of possession of a controlled substance does not require a 
specific intent. It only requires the knowledge that one is in possession of the 
substance and either knowledge of the identity of the substance (e.g., in this 
case that it was [Oxycodone]), or knowledge that the substance was a controlled 
substance." State v. Neal, 155 Idaho 484, 487, 314 P.3d 166, 169 (2013) 
4 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). The pattern instruction of ICJI 403 
correctly states this law. See State v. Tucker, 131 Idaho 174, 177, 953 P.2d 614, 
617 (1998) (ICJI 403 is modeled on the language specifically approved in this 
case, after omitting disapproved language); State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512, 513-
14, 129 P.3d 1261, 1262-63 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Amelia, 144 Idaho 332, 
333-35, 160 P.3d 771, 772-74 (Ct. App. 2007). "It is clear that if one possesses 
a controlled substance different from the one he or she thought[,] but believed it 
to be a controlled substance, that person is guilty of possession of whatever 
controlled substance it turns out to be." Tucker, 131 Idaho at 178, 953 P.2d at 
618 (Schroeder, J., concurring). 
The district court altered the approved instruction that correctly stated the 
mental state element, and instead gave an incorrect instruction that misstated the 
law. To the extent Razo relied on a mistake of fact based on his belief that the 
substance was Suboxone instead of Oxycodone, such did not negate the general 
intent element of the crime and was not a defense. Because the district court 
incorrectly stated the law, and created a mistake of fact defense where none 
exists, the court erred. 
The state is cognizant that if Razo was in fact ignorant of the presence of 
Oxycodone such would be a defense to the charge, even if he was aware of the 
presence of, and intended to possess, Suboxone. "[T]he defendant's ignorance 
of the presence of the substance, or mistaken belief that it was an innocuous 
material, if believed by the jury, would be exculpatory." State v. Armstrong, 142 
Idaho 62, 64, 122 P.3d 321, 323 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoted in State v. Goggin, 157 
5 
Idaho 1, 8, 333 P.3d 112, 118 (2014)). Such was adequately covered by the 
definition of possession, however, which informed the jury that "[a] person has 
possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has physical 
control of it .... " (R., p. 129.) If the jury believed Razo's testimony that he was in 
fact ignorant of the presence of Oxycodone, and was aware only of the presence 
of Suboxone, the jury would have necessarily concluded that he did not 
"possess" the Oxycodone, as that term is defined by law.2 It was unnecessary to 
misstate the mental state element of the crime to make clear to the jury that 
ignorance of the presence of Oxycodone, if evidence of such was believed by the 
jury, was a defense to this crime. 
D. This Issue Is Not Moot 
"An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial 
controversy that is capable of being concluded by judicial relief." State v. 
Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (quotations and citations 
omitted). There are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: "(1) when there 
is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising 
the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and 
thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises 
concerns of substantial public interest." kt (citations and quotations omitted). 
2 Such a scenario would present itself any time two controlled substances are 
mixed, such as when PCP or methamphetamine is added to marijuana. It is the 
state's position that a defendant who possessed marijuana he knew was laced 
with another controlled substance would be guilty of possession of the lacing 
agent regardless of ignorance or mistake of exactly what it was, while a 
defendant ignorant of anything but the marijuana is not guilty of possession of 
any controlled substance but marijuana. 
6 
Although the State is not asking, nor can it be granted, any relief, this issue is not 
moot because it will evade review and repeat and because it raises concerns of 
substantial public interest. 
The district court reasoned that it could not find "any basis in Idaho law" 
for the approved instruction, ICJI 403, and concluded the "statute doesn't say 
what the instruction says." (Tr., p. 139, Ls. 20-23.) Moreover, the court 
concluded that the language of ICJI 403 was not supported by the case law and 
was incorrect, without regard to the facts of this particular case. (Tr., p. 139, L. 
23 - p. 140, L. 21.) Ultimately, the court concluded, the defendant must have 
knowledge that the substance he possessed was the substance he was charged 
with possessing, and that belief the substance was a different controlled 
substance was inadequate to support a conviction. (See Tr., p. 142, Ls. 1-13; p. 
143, Ls. 9-21.) Thus, rejection of the approved (and, as shown above, correct) 
jury instruction means that the juries could be erroneously instructed, and the 
state's burden increased, in every controlled substance case handled by this 
particular district judge, and could even become accepted by other district 
judges. Although the jury convicted in this case, it is not hard to believe that in a 
future case a defendant could be acquitted for a mistake of fact that does not 
legally exonerate him. Thus, this case presents concerns of substantial public 
interest. 
Moreover, the state will not foreseeably have an opportunity to correct this 
error. Upon either conviction or acquittal, the state will be barred by double 
jeopardy from seeking any remedy. See State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370, 
7 
256 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2011) (double jeopardy bars state from second 
prosecution after acquittal or conviction). For these reasons this issue is capable 
of repetition and likely to evade judicial review. The state's challenge to the 
district court's ruling is thus not moot. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court erred by rejecting ICJI 403 because that instruction is a 
correct statement of the law. Although moot, exceptions allowing appellate 
review apply. The state therefore requests this court to consider the issue and 
hold that the district court erred. 
DATED this 17th day of March, 20 5. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13A 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance, 
to-wit: Oxycodone, the State must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about November 2, 2013, 
2. in the State of Idaho, 
3. the defendant, BENITO RAZO-CHAVEZ, possessed any amount of 
oxycodone, and 
4. the defendant either knew it was oxycodone or believed it was oxycodone. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty. 
APPENDIX B 
ICJI 403 POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, the state must prove each of the 
following: 
1. On or about [date] 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant [name] possessed any amount of [name 
of substance], and 
4. the defendant either knew it was [name of 
substance] or believed it was a controlled substance. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find defendant not guilty. If 
each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
Comment 
I.e. § 37-2732(a). If the charge is possession of a 
controlled substance by an inmate, see ICJI 604. 
If the defendant is charged with "second offense" drug 
possession, I.e. § 37-2739, that issue should be presented 
in a bifurcated proceeding. 
In State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 866 P.2d 181 (1993), the 
Supreme Court held that I.e. § 37-2732(c) does not set 
forth any mental state as an element of the crime of 
possession of a controlled substance. "Thus, as [this 
statute] does not expressly require any mental element and 
I.C. § 18-114 only requires a general intent, we conclude 
that the offense only requires a general intent, that is, 
the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance.n 
The Court held that the defendant's lack of knowledge that 
the substance was illegal (as a controlled substance) was 
irrelevant. 
In order to establish possession of a controlled substance, 
a defendant need not have actual physical possession of the 
substance; the state need only prove that the defendant had 
such dominion and control over the substance to establish 
constructive possession. State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 
887 P.2d 57 (Ct. App. 1994). Constructive possession of a 
controlled substance exists where a nexus between the 
accused and the substance is sufficiently proven so as to 
give rise to the reasonable inference that the accused was 
not simply a bystander but, rather, had the power and 
intent to exercise dominion and control over the substance. 
State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 945 P.2d 1390 (Ct. App. 
1997) . 
Even trace or residual quantities of cocaine fall within 
the scope of I.C. § 37-2732(c). State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 
144, 983 P.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The statute does not contain a mental element. The 
committee concluded, based upon State v. Lamphere, 130 
Idaho 630, 945 P.2d 1 (1997), a mental element as set forth 
in element 4 should be included. 
